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This paper is a contribution to the analysis of optimal monetary policy. It begins with a
critical assessment of the existing literature, arguing that most work is based on implausible
models of inﬂation-output dynamics. It then suggests that this problem may be solved
with some recent behavioral models, which assume that price setters are slow to incorporate
macroeconomic information into the prices they set. A speciﬁc such model is developed and
used to derive optimal policy. In response to shocks to productivity and aggregate demand,
optimal policy is price level targeting. Base drift in the price level, which is implicit in
the inﬂation targeting regimes currently used in many central banks, is not desirable in this
model. When shocks to desired markups are added, optimal policy is ﬂexible targeting of the
price level. That is, the central bank should allow the price level to deviate from its target
for a while in response to these supply shocks, but it should eventually return the price level
to its target path. Optimal policy can also be described as an elastic price standard: the
central bank allows the price level to deviate from its target when output is expected to
deviate from its natural rate.1I N T R O D U C T I O N
What policy rule should a central bank follow? Recent years have seen a resurgence of
theoretical research on this classic question. Most of this work has built on “new Keynesian”
models of the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ derived from forward-looking models of staggered
price adjustment. Unfortunately, these models make implausible predictions about the eﬀects
of monetary policy: for example, they imply that a policy change that gradually reduces
inﬂation causes an output boom. There is therefore good reason to be skeptical about what
the literature tells us about the eﬀects of alternative policies.
This paper tries to make progress toward determining which policies are optimal by
studying this question in a model that more closely ﬁts the facts about monetary policy.
In particular, we draw on recent behavioral models of the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ based
on the assumption that agents are slow to incorporate information about macroeconomic
conditions, even if the information is publicly available. Recent work has shown that such
models capture the inertia that is central to inﬂation dynamics in modern economies. These
models should provide more reliable insights into the policy choices facing central banks.
Section 2 of this paper brieﬂy reviews the two literatures on which our work builds, the
work on optimal monetary policy and the work on behavioral macroeconomics. Section 3
presents a speciﬁc model, which builds on the “sticky information” model of Mankiw and
Reis (2002), and Section 4 discusses the determinants of welfare in this model. Sections 5,
6 and 7 derive the optimal policy rules in the model. Section 8 compares our results with
those obtained from the standard new Keynesian Phillips curve. Section 9 concludes.
Our central result is that price level targeting is the optimal policy in the model. In-
ﬂation targeting — the currently popular policy of allowing base drift in the price level —
is suboptimal. When the economy is hit by shocks to aggregate demand or productivity,
strict price level targeting is optimal: policymakers should return the price level to a pre-
determined path as quickly as possible. However, if there are persistent shocks to ﬁrms’
markups, the optimal rule allows temporary deviations from the long-run price target. In
this way, the prescriptions of our model are similar to the practice of many central banks,
which allow temporary deviations from policy rules in response to “supply shocks.” One can
1also describe optimal policy as the elastic price standard proposed by Hall (1984). Under
this policy, the price level can deviate from target as long as output is expected to deviate
from its natural rate.
2M O T I V A T I O N
This paper arises from two recent literatures — one on optimal rules for monetary policy and
one on behavioral approaches to the Phillips curve. We believe that the second may hold
t h eh o p eo fr e m e d y i n gs o m ed e ﬁciencies in the ﬁrst. The natural place to start our analysis
is with a brief overview of these two broad literatures.
2.1 The Sorry State of Monetary Policy Analysis
In recent research on policy rules, a canonical approach has emerged. The researcher sets
up a model based on monopolistically competitive producers, with monetary nonneutrality
arising because of some friction in price setting. Policymakers are assumed to choose policy
to minimize a loss function, which is either assumed or derived as an approximation to agents’
utility functions. With this framework in hand, the researcher can derive the optimal policy
rule and evaluate policy proposals, such as targeting inﬂation or the price level. Goodfriend
and King (1997) have referred to this literature as the New Neoclassical Synthesis, while
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) have called it the New Keynesian Science of Monetary
Policy. Whatever the label, there is no doubt that this approach to monetary-policy analysis
is large and growing.
Yet policymakers should be wary of the prescriptions that this literature has yielded. The
results in any such analysis depend crucially on the assumed model of the Phillips curve,
which determines how inﬂation is related to output movements and expectations. The results
should be believed only if the assumed Phillips curve is credible. Unfortunately, that is rarely
the case.
The most common approach is to use the new Keynesian Phillips curve. This model
is based on the assumption of time-contingent price adjustment and is derived from the
seminal papers of Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982), and Calvo (1983). The model’s appealing
2microeconomic foundations have made it the workhorse of much of the modern literature on
monetary policy. The papers by Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999) are two examples.
There is, however, a problem with this approach: Because the new Keynesian Phillips
curve lacks any source of inﬂation inertia, it makes absurdly counterfactual predications
about the eﬀects of monetary policy. According to this model, disinﬂations can result in
booms rather than recessions (Ball, 1994). Similarly, the model fails to explain why monetary
policy shocks have a delayed and gradual eﬀect on inﬂation (Mankiw, 2001). One should
be suspect of policy recommendations arising from any model that is patently inconsistent
with both the econometric evidence and the views of central bankers about their inﬂuence
over the economy.
An alternative approach to using the new Keynesian Phillips curve is to use a more
traditional accelerationist Phillips curve. This approach, which can be justiﬁed with the
assumption of backward-looking expectations, has the advantage that it is consistent with
the conventional wisdom about the eﬀects of monetary policy and with standard empirical
analyses of inﬂation (e.g., Gordon, 1997; Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997). For these
reasons, Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997) take an accelerationist Phillips curve as a starting
point for their analyses.
Yet this approach is also problematic. Although inﬂation inertia is a feature of the U.S.
monetary regime of the past several decades, this was not true when the economy operated
under a gold standard. (Barsky, 1987; Alogoskouﬁs and Smith, 1991). When analyzing
alternative policy rules, it is imperative that expectations be allowed to adjust to the new
regime. Regardless of how well it ﬁts the recent data, the accelerationist Phillips curve is
a suspect tool for monetary-policy analysis. When analyzing alternative monetary policy
rules, ignoring the Lucas critique is not just an aesthetic faux pas; it produces results that
are, literally, incredible.
The problems with both the new Keynesian and the accelerationist Phillips curves are
increasingly understood. This has led some authors to suggest a compromise. According
to the so-called “hybrid” Phillips curve, a subset of agents have backward-looking inﬂation
expectations and the rest have rational expectations (e.g., Gali and Gertler, 1999). Yet this
3compromise may yield the worst of both worlds. Like the new Keynesian Phillips curve, the
hybrid model yields an immediate jump in inﬂation in response to monetary policy shocks
(unless all agents are backward looking). Like the accelerationist Phillips curve, the hybrid
model fails to explain the absence of inﬂation inertia under earlier monetary regimes (unless
no agents are backward looking). That is, by taking a weighted average of two ﬂawed models,
the hybrid model of the Phillips curve ends up with the ﬂaws of each.
2.2 The Promise of Behavioral Models
Behavioral economics might oﬀer a way out of this conundrum. Behavioral economics is,
broadly deﬁned, the growing subﬁeld that incorporates into economic theory the ﬂaws in
human decision-making that are ignored in the standard model of rational man. It ﬁnds its
roots in Herbert Simon’s suggestion that people are “satisﬁcers” rather than rational maxi-
mizers. Many economists have suggested that departures from rationality may be important
for issues in macroeconomics (Akerlof, 2002; Sargent, 1993). In particular, several recent
papers on the microfoundations of the Phillips curve have proposed that monetary nonneu-
trality arises because people are slow to process widely available macroeconomic information.
When Milton Friedman (1968) introduced the natural rate hypothesis in his AEA presi-
dential address, he proposed a theory of monetary nonneutrality that, to modern ears, sounds
remarkably behavioral. According to Friedman, when the money supply rises unexpectedly,
the price level rises, pushing down the real wage. Employers hire more because the cost of
labor has fallen. Employees are willing to work more because they focus on the nominal wage
and infer (incorrectly) that the reward for working has risen. Friedman did not explain this
asymmetry in information between ﬁrms and workers. For him, it seemed natural to assume
that workers lacked full information about macroeconomic conditions. This ignorance was
the centerpiece of Friedman’s proposed explanation for the short-run Phillips curve.
Work that followed on Friedman’s ideas tried to incorporate rational economic man into
the story. The task has proved diﬃcult. Lucas (1973) suggested a model in which producers
observe the prices of what they sell but not of what they buy and, as a result, need to solve
signal-extraction problems to infer relative prices. Critics of the Lucas model wondered why
a rational man would fail to use the widely available information on the consumer price
4index, which is published monthly. Fischer (1977) told a version of Friedman’s story in
which workers were locked into long-term contracts setting the nominal wage. Critics of the
Fischer model wondered why a rational man would ever agree to such an ineﬃcient contract
ex ante or fail to renegotiate it ex post.
In recent years, there have been several attempts to come up with better models of
inﬂation dynamics by returning to Friedman’s idea that some people fail to incorporate
all available macroeconomic information into their decision-making. According to the new
Keynesian Phillips curve, prices are sticky, but inﬂation can respond instantly to changes in
monetary policy. In practice, inﬂation responds sluggishly. This fact suggests that, for some
reason, price setters aren’t quite awake or smart or informed enough to process all available
information about monetary policy and react immediately to it.
One approach to modeling this inattentiveness is to use the tools of information theory,
as exposited, for instance, in the textbook by Cover and Thomas (1991). Drawing on these
tools, Sims (2001) suggests modeling humans as having a limited channel for absorbing
information. That is, the human brain is imperfect in the same way as a computer with
a slow internet connection would be. Woodford (2001) uses this idea to build a model of
inﬂation-output dynamics. In his model, because price setters learn about monetary policy
through a limited-information channel, it is as if they observe monetary policy with a random
error and have to solve a signal-extraction problem along the lines of Lucas (1973).
Ball (2000) proposes another approach to the problem. He suggests that when forming
expectations of any variable, people optimally use all information in the past values of that
variable, but fail to incorporate information from other variables. That is, expectations are
based on optimal univariate forecasts. Ball shows that this approach can explain why the
accelerationist Phillips curve ﬁts the recent data well, while the earlier data conform more
closely to a classic Phillips curve.
Mankiw and Reis (2002), like Ball and Woodford, impose a constraint on the information
that people use when forming expectations. They assume that in each period there is a ﬁxed
probability that a person updates his information set; otherwise, he continues to set prices
based on outdated information. Mankiw and Reis compare this sticky-information model
with the standard new Keynesian Phillips curve and conclude that it is more consistent with
5standard views about the eﬀects of monetary policy. The Mankiw-Reis model has strong
formal ties to the earlier eﬀorts of Lucas and Fischer, but its bald informational assumption
rejects the attempt to reconcile the Phillips curve with the axiom of rationality.
A weakness of all three of these approaches is that they fail to explain why people do
not incorporate widely available news about monetary policy into their plans. In reality,
it is easy to ﬁnd out what the central bank is doing, but it is often hard to ﬁgure out
what it means. That is, the real problem is not obtaining information but processing it.
Unfortunately, economists do not have the tools to model imperfect information processing.
The approaches of Woodford, Ball, and Mankiw and Reis are all based on the hope that a
model of imperfect information acquisition may serve as a rough substitute.
A strength of all three approaches is that they can explain inﬂa t i o ni n e r t i a . I nt h e s e
models, when monetary policy changes, most price setters are unaware of it, so they keep
marking up prices as if no policy change had occurred. That is, all three models generate
inﬂation inertia by positing a type of inattentiveness on the part of price setters. Because
these models of inattention ﬁt the most basic facts about inﬂation dynamics, they hold out
the greatest promise for delivering credible advice for monetary policy.
In this paper, the speciﬁc model we use is the sticky-information model proposed by
Mankiw and Reis. One reason is tractability. A nice feature of the Mankiw-Reis model
is that, given the dates when people get their information, they have conventional rational
expectations. This feature allows the use of rational-expectations tools to solve for the
resulting equilibrium. That is, we can use many standard and powerful modeling techniques,
while making the behavioral assumption that price setters are inattentive.
3T H E M O D E L
We begin our analysis by presenting the model, including agent’s objectives, market struc-
ture, price setting, and the role of aggregate-demand policy.
63.1 Agents and Market Structure
We assume a simple variation on the standard “yeoman farmer economy” studied by authors
such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2002, chapter 6). The economy
contains a continuum of agents indexed by i,w i t hi distributed uniformly on the unit interval.
Each agent uses his own labor to produce a diﬀerentiated good, sells his good to other agents,
and buys goods to consume.
The utility of agent i in period t is given by
Uit =
C
1−σ
it − 1
1 − σ
−
L
1+ψ
it
1+ψ
, (1)
where Lit is the agent’s labor supply in period t and Cit is a CES aggregator of the agent’s
consumption of diﬀerent goods
Cit =
·Z 1
0
¡
C
j
it
¢ γ−1
γ dj
¸ γ
γ−1
, (2)
where C
j
i is agent i’s consumption of the good produced by agent j. The parameters measur-
ing risk aversion (σ) and the marginal disutility of labor supply (ψ) are non-negative, while
the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent goods (γ) is larger than one. The agent’s
production function is
Yit = AtLit, (3)
where Y is his level of output and A is an aggregate productivity shifter that follows an
arbitrary stochastic process.
As is well-known (e.g., Woodford, 2002, chapter 2), utility maximization with this form
of utility implies that the demand for each good depends on aggregate spending and the
good’s relative price. In logs, the demand function is
yit = yt − γ(pit − pt), (4)
where yi is the log of output by farmer i, y is the log of aggregate output, pi is the log of the
7price charged for good i,a n dp is the log of the price index for the aggregate consumption
good C.
We assume that a government levies a proportional sales tax τt on all goods, which
follows some stationary stochastic process. The tax revenues are used to ﬁnance equal lump
sum rebates to all agents.
These assumptions determine the price for good i that maximizes farmer i’s utility:
p
∗
it = pt + α(yt − y
N
t )+ut, (5)
where α =( ψ+σ)/(1+γψ), yN is the natural level of output, and u reﬂects random variation
in taxes. The natural level of output is deﬁned as the level when prices are ﬂexible (so pi = p∗
i
for all i) and the tax rate is at its average level ¯ τ.I ti sg i v e nb y :
y
N
t =
(1 + ψ)log(At) − log
³
γ
(1−γ)(1−¯ τ)
´
ψ + σ
. (6)
Note that yN varies with the productivity shock A. Finally, the shock u is given by u =
log((1 − ¯ τ)/(1 − τ))/(1 + γψ). This result is derived in the Appendix. The intuition is
simple: as in standard macro models with imperfect competition (e.g., Romer, 2001, chapter
6), an agent’s desired price increases one-for-one with the aggregate price level and depends
positively on total spending in the economy. The price decreases with a positive shock to
productivity and the natural rate (yN) and increases with a rise in indirect taxation (u).
We introduce random taxation because it causes variation in farmer’s “markups” — the
gap between the desired price and the marginal cost of producing output. The key feature of
these shocks is that they change the equilibrium level of output under ﬂexible prices without
changing the eﬃcient level of output — that is, they cause variation in the level of distortions.
In this way, the shocks diﬀer from productivity shocks, which cause changes in equilibrium
output that are eﬃcient. Markup shocks are becoming a standard feature of models used to
analyze monetary policy (e.g., Woodford, 2002; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2002; Steinsson,
2002). Shifts in markups can be justiﬁed diﬀerent ways — for example, there can be shifts
in the degree of collusion in an industry, or shifts in the aggressiveness of wage bargainers
8in models with a labor market. We introduce variable taxation because it is the simplest
way to generate time-varying markups. However, one can interpret our results as applying
to markup variations arising from other sources as well.1
Finally, we again follow Woodford and assume the existence of complete ﬁnancial markets.
This implies perfect risk-sharing in consumption across all agents. The consumption level
of all agents is the same (Cit is the same for all i), although the levels of labor supply and
output can vary.
3.2 Price Setting and Sticky Information
Here we follow Mankiw and Reis (2002). Each period, a fraction λ of farmers, chosen
randomly, receives complete information on the state of the economy. Prices are perfectly
ﬂexible in the sense that prices are adjusted by all farmers in each period. However, prices
are set based only on the last information received by each farmer. We take a ﬁrst-order
approximation to optimal price-setting, which yields certainty-equivalent behavior. Thus,
when farmer i sets his price in period t, he sets it equal to his expectation of the optimal
price:
p
k
it = Et−kp
∗
it, (7)
where t − k is the last period when the farmer received information.
Again taking a ﬁrst-order approximation, we measure the log of the price level, p,b yt h e
average of the individual prices pi.T h u sp is the average of prices set based on information
at all past dates, weighted by the proportion of ﬁrms that last received information in each
period. Mankiw and Reis aggregate the rule for individual price setting, (5), to derive the
behavior of the price level in the absence of markup and productivity shocks. The Appendix
to this paper extends their analysis to include these shocks, which is straightforward. The
bottom line can be expressed as an equation either for the price level, or for aggregate
1In Ball and Mankiw (1995), for example, supply shocks arise from the interaction of menu costs and
asymmetries in the distribution of relative shocks. The key eﬀect of these shocks, however, is to change
average markups, because ﬁrms with positive relative shocks respond more or less than ﬁrms with negative
shocks.
9inﬂation πt = pt − pt−1:
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(9)
These equations show that the price level and its rate of change depend on current output
and the shocks in the model, as well as past expectations of prices, output, and shocks at
the various times farmers receive information. Not surprisingly, an adverse technology shock
o rar i s ei nt h ed e s i r e dm a r k u pr a i s e st h ec u r r e n tp r i c el e v e l .
The second version of the equation is the sticky information Phillips curve that Mankiw
and Reis propose as a replacement for the new Keynesian Phillips curve arising from the
Calvo model of staggered price adjustment. Mankiw and Reis show that their model performs
better at ﬁtting the stylized facts about the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ than does the new
Keynesian equation. In particular, it captures the fact that a monetary contraction that
gradually reduces inﬂation also reduces output, whereas the Calvo model implies that gradual
disinﬂations are expansionary.
3.3 The Demand Side and Policy
The equation for the price level, (8), summarizes the supply side of the model. We close the
model with the simplest possible demand side: the quantity equation. That is, we assume a
cash-in-advance constraint that implies that nominal spending is proportional to the money
supply, or
yt = mt − pt, (10)
where m is the log of the money supply.
We assume that policymakers control the money supply up to a white-noise control error.
10In every period t, they choose a money-supply target ˆ m,a n d
mt =ˆ mt + et, (11)
where et is a serially uncorrelated control error. ˆ mt is set in period t − 1, before the pro-
ductivity and markup shocks for t are observed. These assumptions capture the facts that
policy decisions aﬀect the economy with a lag and that there are exogenous shifts in ag-
gregate demand that policy cannot oﬀset contemporaneously. We interpret the monetary
control error as standing in for other kinds of demand shocks, such as shifts in ﬁscal policy
or in conﬁdence.
In principle, one can solve for the optimal money-supply rule in this model. A diﬀerent
way of analyzing the problem is more appealing, however. Using equations (8)-(11), the
Appendix derives a reduced form for the price level pt as a linear function of the target
money supply, ˆ mt, variables determined before t,a n ds h o c k sa tt (the monetary control
error and the unexpected component of the productivity and markup shocks). Since the
shocks are unforecastable, this implies a linear relation between ˆ mt and the expectation of
the price level Et−1pt, given the predetermined variables. Thus the choice at t−1 of a target
money supply is implicitly a choice of the expected price level at t, that is, a price-level target.
We can therefore interpret Et−1pt as the policy instrument, and solve for the optimal rule
for this target as a function of all information through period t − 1. One can use the result
in the Appendix to ﬁnd the money-supply rule that implements the optimal price-targeting
rule, but we will not emphasize this form of policy.
Note that our model of the demand side is simpler than those in most recent work
on policy rules. It is common to assume that policymakers control an interest rate, and
to relate the interest rate to output through an IS or aggregate-spending equation. If we
added such an equation to our model, we could still interpret the expected price level as the
policy instrument; a rule for the price target would implicitly deﬁne an interest rate rule
that implements it. We choose not to introduce an IS curve because there is currently no
consensus about the right speciﬁcation.2
2The debate about the IS curve parallels the debate about the Phillips curve, with some authors ad-
114W E L F A R E
The next step is to consider welfare in our model, which will provide the foundation for the
policy analysis in the next section.
4.1 Woodford’s Approximation
We deﬁne welfare in a period as the average level of utility across all farmers. We assume
the discount factor approaches one, so policymakers seek to minimize the unconditional
expectation of welfare.3 Following similar steps to Woodford (2002), the Appendix shows
that a second-order approximation of farmers’ utility functions is
−Va r(yt − y
N
t ) − χE[Va r i(yit − yt)] + t.i.p., (12)
where χ =( ψ + γ−1)/(ψ + σ) and t.i.p stands for terms independent of policy.
The two terms in this expression are intuitive. The ﬁrst is the variability of output
around the natural level. (Note that the natural level of output is not eﬃcient, because of
the distortion caused by the average markup. However, variability around yN diﬀers from
variability around eﬃcient output only by a constant independent of policy.) The second
term captures the cross-sectional variability of output across diﬀerent ﬁrms. Variability at
the ﬁrm level is ineﬃcient because it creates variability in labor supply around the eﬃcient
level. Throughout our analysis we deﬁne the “optimal” monetary policy as the one that
minimizes the expression in equation (12).
Another way of writing the objective function is useful. The demand equation (4) implies
that a farmer’s output yi is proportional to his relative price pi − p.T h u st h ev a r i a n c eo fyi
vocating forward-looking speciﬁcations and others advocating backward-looking speciﬁcations. Gabaix and
Laibson’s (2001) work on lagged consumption responses to the stock market suggests that applying the
sticky-information assumption to spending decisions and thus the IS curve may be a fruitful line of pursuit.
In the model we consider here, however, the stickiness of information aﬀects only the yeoman farmer’s price
setting decision.
3While the assumption that the discount factor approaches one simpliﬁes the exposition, most of our
results can be obtained with a discount factor smaller than one.
12is proportional to the variance of pi − p.T h u sw ec a nw r i t ew e l f a r ea s
−Va r(yt − y
N
t ) − ωE[Va r i(pit − pt)] + t.i.p., (13)
where ω = χγ2. That is, welfare depends on the variance of the output gap and the cross-
sectional variance of relative prices.
4.2 Welfare with Mankiw-Reis Price-Setting
To analyze the model, we need to determine how the terms in the loss function depend on
aggregate variables. Here is the ﬁrst point at which our results for the sticky-information
model depart from those for the Calvo model. In the Calvo model, Woodford (2002) shows
that the cross-sectional variability of prices is determined by current and lagged values of
inﬂation squared. In contrast, the following result gives an expression for cross-sectional
price variability in terms of aggregate variables in our model:
Lemma 1
Va r i(pit − pt)=
∞ X
j=1
ηj (pt − Et−j(pt))
2 , (14)
where:
ηj ≡
µ
λ(1 − λ)j
(1 − (1 − λ)j)(1− (1 − λ)j+1)
¶
Thus the variance of relative prices depends on the squared deviations of the price level from
the levels expected at all past dates. The weights ηj decline as j increases.
This result is derived in the Appendix. The intuition is straightforward. Surprises in the
aggregate price level create micro price variability because prices for a given period are set
based on information at various times in the past. In period t, surprises since t − j aﬀect
the prices of agents who have received information since then, but not the prices of other
agents.
13The bottom line, therefore, is that welfare is approximated by a weighted average of
equation (14) and the variance of (y − yN). In the analysis below, we experiment with
various weights on these two terms. Fortunately, the results are not very sensitive to the
weights we assume. In particular, most of our analysis holds even if the weight on (14) is
zero, so that the loss function is Va r(y − yN), the simple loss function assumed in much
work on optimal monetary policy.
5 OPTIMAL POLICY WITH DEMAND AND
PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS
We now turn to our central question: what is the optimal policy rule in the model? In
this section, we simplify things by eliminating the markup shock u from the model. In
this case, the model has two shocks, the productivity shock and the demand shock (i.e.,
monetary control error). The optimal policy rule turns out to be very simple. The next
section discusses the complications arising from the introduction of markup shocks.
5.1 Results
Recall that we can describe policy as a rule for the price target, Et−1pt. In our model,
Proposition 1 With only productivity and demand shocks, the set of optimal policies is the
set of rules Et−1pt = Kt,w h e r eKt follows a deterministic path known at the beginning of
time.
To interpret this result, note ﬁr s tt h a to n eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi st h eo n ei nw h i c hKt is a constant.
In this case, policy targets a ﬁxed price level, the purest form of “price level targeting.”
According to the Proposition, however, it is optimal also to allow the target to change over
time, as long as the changes are deterministic. The target price level could grow at a constant
rate or follow some more complicated (but predictable) path.
Proposition 1 is proved in the Appendix. We note here that it is not surprising that any
deterministic path for the price level is as good as any other. In the model, the non-neutrality
14of monetary policy arises from surprises that it creates that are not observed immediately by
all price setters. A deterministic price path creates no surprises and thus has no real eﬀects.
Having shown what policies are optimal, it is easy to point out some that are not optimal:
Corollary 1 Inﬂation targeting — a policy that sets Et−1πt equal to a constant — is subop-
timal. So is nominal income targeting — a policy that sets Et−1(pt + yt) equal to a constant.
This result follows from the facts that only price-level targeting is optimal, and that inﬂa-
tion and nominal-income targeting diﬀer from price-level targeting. It is well-known that
inﬂation targeting allows “base drift”: it means that the target for the price level is adjusted
one-for-one with past shocks to the price level. Thus the price target does not follow a deter-
ministic path, as required by Proposition 1. Nominal income targeting would be equivalent
to price-level targeting if there were only demand shocks. However, in the case of productiv-
ity shocks, nominal income targeting implies that the shocks have persistent eﬀects on both
the price level and output, so the expected price level is not deterministic. It is optimal for
output alone to respond to a productivity shock, as this keeps output in line with its natural
level yN
t .
5.2 Discussion
T h e s er e s u l t sa r es i g n i ﬁcant in light of the current practice of policymaking. There is a
s t r o n gt r e n di nt h ew o r l dt o w a r d si n ﬂation targeting, with dozens of countries adopting
some version of this policy since the early 1990s. Many observers suggest that U.S. policy is
close to inﬂation targeting, although the target is not explicit. In our model, however, this
popular policy is sub-optimal. Welfare is higher if policymakers target the price level rather
than the inﬂation rate - that is, if they eliminate base drift in prices.
To understand this result, it is useful to compare the dynamic eﬀects of shocks under
price-level and inﬂation targeting. We focus here on demand shocks; the story for pro-
ductivity shocks is similar, since demand and productivity shocks have symmetric eﬀects
on the output gap y − yN. Figure 1 shows the responses of the aggregate price level and
aggregate output to a unit demand shock under the two policies, assuming α =0 .1 and
λ =0 .25, the baseline values in Mankiw and Reis. The Figure also shows the response of the
15cross-sectional variance of prices. In the period when a shock occurs, all the eﬀects are the
same under price-level and inﬂation targeting, reﬂecting the fact that policy cannot respond
contemporaneously to shocks. After the initial period, price targeting implies that all the
eﬀects disappear completely. In contrast, the eﬀects on both output and relative prices die
out slowly under inﬂation targeting. This persistence in the eﬀects of shocks increases both
components of the social loss function, the variance of the output gap and the variance of
relative prices.
To understand these results, suppose the economy starts in a steady state in which all
prices are zero, the output gap is zero, and this situation is expected to continue forever.
A demand shock occurs in period zero; it inevitably raises output at zero and it raises the
price level as well because ﬁrms who receive information in that period adjust their current
prices. But these eﬀects disappear in subsequent periods under price-level targeting. In these
periods, some prices are set by ﬁrms who have not observed the shock, and therefore are ﬁxed
at zero. Price-level targeting means the monetary authority must induce informed ﬁrms to
set prices of zero as well, so the aggregate price level returns to zero. In this case relative-
price variability is eliminated, since informed and uninformed ﬁrms set the same prices. In
addition, to induce the informed ﬁrms to choose the same price as the uninformed, monetary
policy must produce an output gap of zero, since only a zero output gap implies a desired
relative price of zero. Thus price targeting eliminates the output eﬀects of the shock after
period zero as well as the relative-price eﬀects.
In contrast, inﬂation targeting means the price level must remain at a positive level after
the shock raises it in period zero. Because the uninformed still choose prices of zero in
subsequent periods, the monetary authority must induce the informed to choose positive
prices to keep the aggregate price level positive. This creates variability across the prices of
informed and uninformed ﬁrms, and it requires a positive output gap to induce the informed
to set positive relative prices.
Underlying these results is the fact that demand shocks aﬀect real variables in the sticky
information model by creating surprises in the price level. These surprises create both
relative price variability (see equation (14)) and output movements (note from (8) that the
output gap is zero if the price level equals the level expected in all previous periods). To
16stabilize the economy, the monetary authority needs to minimize price surprises. It does so
by reversing deviations of the price level from its expected path as quickly as possible. It
should not exacerbate uncertainty about the price level by allowing base drift.
6O P T I M A L P O L I C Y W I T H M A R K U P S H O C K S
The optimal policy is more complicated in the presence of markup shocks. In this case,
strict price level targeting is no longer optimal. Instead, policymakers must make special
accommodations for markup shocks, the nature of which depends on the serial correlation
of the shocks.
We assume the markup shock follows an arbitrary stationary process with MA represen-
tation ut =
P∞
j=0 ρjεt−j,w h e r eεt is a white-noise innovation. Given this notation, we have
Proposition 2 With productivity, demand, and markup shocks, the set of optimal policies
is the set of rules:
Et−1pt = Kt +
∞ X
j=1
φjεt−j, (15)
where
φj ≡
ρj
α2ω +
(1−λ)j+1
1−(1−λ)j+1
,
and Kt is again deterministic.
This Proposition is proved in the Appendix.
To interpret Proposition 2, consider ﬁrst the case of white-noise markup shocks. In this
case all the ρj’s are zero, so all the φj’s are zero: the optimal policy is strict price level
targeting as before. If the markup shock is serially correlated, however, then the price target
is adjusted in response to past shocks. If all the ρj’s are positive, then an increase in the
markup raises the price target for awhile. However, as long as the markup is stationary, the
price level is also stationary: it eventually returns to the target path given by Kt.
17Figure 2 illustrates this result for particular parameterizations of the model. The Figure
shows how the price level responds to a unit shock to the innovation ε. In this simulation,
again we set α =0 .1 and λ =0 .25. We assume the markup shocks follow an AR(1) process
with a coeﬃcient of ¯ ρ so ρj =¯ ρj. We experiment with two values for ¯ ρ, 0.8 and 0.4.F i n a l l y ,
we set the parameter ω equal to one, which means that output variance and relative-price
variance have the same weight in the social loss function.
In Figure 2, the price level jumps up at the time of the markup shock, which is inevitable
since policy cannot respond contemporaneously. In contrast to the cases of demand and
productivity shocks, the price level remains high after the initial period; it either follows a
hump-shaped pattern (for ¯ ρ =0 .8) or falls monotonically (for ¯ ρ =0 .4). In either case, the
price level eventually converges back to its long-run target.
The optimal response to markup shocks reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between the goals of stabilizing
relative prices and stabilizing output. As with demand and productivity shocks, relative-
price variance is minimized by a strict price level target, as this causes informed ﬁrms to set
prices at the same level as uninformed ﬁrms. Such a policy requires a large fall in output,
however: a higher markup means ﬁrms desire higher relative prices for a given output level,
so low output is needed to induce ﬁrms to choose a zero relative price. Given this trade-oﬀ,
optimal policy allows output to fall somewhat but not enough to stabilize relative prices
fully. It induces informed ﬁrms to set positive prices as long as the shock persists.
Our model implies that the optimal response to markup shocks depends on the serial
correlation of the shocks. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to calibrate this serial correlation.
Like other authors, we would like to interpret markup shifts as metaphors for the “supply
shocks” that inﬂuence real-world inﬂation, but there is no consensus about the nature of
these shocks. If we interpret the model literally, so markup shocks arise from tax changes,
it is natural to interpret these changes as highly persistent. Similarly, if markup shocks are
interpreted as changes in union aggressiveness, it is plausible to assume persistence in union
attitudes. However, some kinds of real-world supply shocks may have more transitory eﬀects
on desired prices. We need a better understanding of supply shocks to make progress on
designing optimal policies.
Our model suggests that policymakers should treat price-level movements in a special
18way if they arise from certain kinds of supply shocks. In this respect, the model’s prescrip-
tions match policymaking in many countries. It is common for inﬂation targeters to allow
deviations from their normal targets when supply shocks occur. Sometimes, this is accom-
plished by explicit “caveats” to policy, as in New Zealand. More often, policymakers allow
temporary deviations from the target by focusing on an “underlying” or “core” measure of
inﬂation that strips out the eﬀects of supply shocks. Our analysis suggests that policymakers
are on the right track in making exceptions to their policies for supply shocks — although
the basic policy target should be the price level, not inﬂation as in current practice.
7 A SIMPLE DESCRIPTION OF OPTIMAL
POLICY
So far, we have described optimal policy as a function of the exogenous driving variables.
There is, however, a simpler description of optimal policy in terms of the endogenous vari-
ables:
Proposition 3 For an economy that experiences shocks to demand, productivity, and
markups, optimal monetary policy can be described as:
Et−1pt = Kt −
1
αω
Et−1(yt − y
N
t ). (16)
That is, monetary policy commits to a deterministic path for the price level, represented here
by Kt, and allows the expected price level to deviate from the target path only if output is
expected to deviate from its natural rate.4
4Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999, p. 1704) derive an equation for optimal policy that closely resembles
this proposition in an analysis based on the Calvo model of price adjustment. This similarity of optimal
policies under Calvo and Mankiw-Reis price setting is not robust, however. The result of Clarida, Gali
and Gertler is based on the assumption that the monetary authority can set the money supply based on
contemporaneous information. Yet if policymakers can aﬀect the economy only with a lag (that is, if there
are control errors), as we have assumed, then optimal monetary policy in the Calvo model can no longer be
described by such a simple rule. In the next section, we explore more fully the similarities and diﬀerences
between the two models.
19This proposition encompasses our previous results. In the case of shocks to demand or
productivity, discussed in Section 4, optimal policy has the property that Et−1(yt−yN
t )=0 .
Thus, Proposition 3 includes Proposition 1 as a special case. In the case of shocks to the
markup, the expected price level varies as a complicated function of the shocks, as shown in
Proposition 2, but it does so in a way that precisely parallels the expected output gap. This
can be seen in Figure 2, where the paths of output and the price level after period zero are
reﬂe c t i o n so fe a c ho t h e r .
One remarkable fact about Proposition 3 is that it closely resembles the monetary policy
rule proposed by Hall (1984), who dubbed it an “elastic price standard.” Hall does not
present a formal model to back up his proposal, but his informal and intuitive arguments
a r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h em o d e lw eh a v ee x p l o r e dh e r e .O n ed i ﬀerence is that Hall advocates
a constant target (Kt), whereas in our model a rising target for the price level would serve
equally well. In either case, the expected output gap determines how much the central bank
can allow the price level to deviate from its target.
8 COMPARISON TO THE NEW KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS
CURVE
We have argued that the sticky-information Phillips curve of Mankiw and Reis is a better
tool for monetary-policy analysis than the popular new Keynesian Phillips curve, because
it has more realistic implications about the interactions of output and inﬂation. But does
the choice of a Phillips curve make a diﬀerence for our results about optimal policy? To
address this issue, we now reconsider our policy problem using the new Keynesian Phillips
curve - the relation derived from Calvo’s (1983) model of staggered price adjustment with
full information. As is well known, this Phillips curve (with no discounting) is
πt = Etπt+1 + κ(yt − y
N
t )+u
0
t, κ > 0, (17)
where u0
t is proportional to the markup shock ut. As discussed by Mankiw and Reis (2002),
ac r i t i c a ld i ﬀerence between this equation and the Phillips curve arising from the sticky-
20information model is the timing of expectations. Rather than past expectations of current
inﬂation, it is the current expectation of next period’s inﬂation that enters the new Key-
nesian speciﬁcation. This feature of the model is mainly responsible for its counterfactual
predictions.
8.1 Implications for the Welfare Function
Note ﬁrst that the choice of a Phillips curve aﬀects the determinants of aggregate welfare. As
shown in Section 3, the canonical model of monopolistic competition yields an approximate
loss function with two terms, the variance of the output gap and the variance of relative
prices. This result is robust, but the determinants of the variance of relative prices depends
on the speciﬁcation of price adjustment. In the Mankiw-Reis model, the variance of relative
prices depends on the variance of unexpected changes in the price level (see equation (14)).
In the Calvo model, it is determined by current and lagged values of inﬂation squared. Thus
the two models produce loss functions that have one term in common, the variance of the
output gap, and one term that diﬀers across models. Thus one would expect the models
to deliver diﬀerent results about optimal policies. However, the main diﬀerences discussed
below do not depend on the diﬀerence in loss functions. The diﬀerences in results arise even
when the weight on the variance of relative prices in the loss function is zero, so that the
loss function is simply the variance of the output gap in both models.
8.2 Implications for Base Drift
We now consider optimal policy in a model that is identical to ours except that the Calvo
sticky-price assumption replaces the Mankiw-Reis sticky-information assumption, so that
the Phillips curve becomes equation (17) above. The following result shows a key diﬀerence
between the normative implications of the two models:
Proposition 4 With Calvo price adjustment, the optimal policy rule when there are demand
or productivity shocks is: Et−1πt= δπt−1,w h e r e0 < δ < 1.
That is, the Calvo model supports ﬂexible inﬂation targeting rather than price level targeting.
21Put diﬀerently, allowing base drift in the price level in response to demand and productivity
shocks is optimal with Calvo price setting, while it is not with Mankiw-Reis price setting.
The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 implies not only a unit root in the price level but also persistence in
inﬂation. In particular, the inﬂation rate is AR(1) with parameter δ. We believe that the
following intuition explains the optimality of inﬂation persistence in the Calvo model: When
the economy experiences a positive demand shock, output and the price level both rise.
If the monetary authority responds to this shock by committing to higher inﬂation in the
future, then price setters will respond to the shock by raising their prices more aggressively.
This more aggressive price response implies a smaller initial output response, keeping the
economy closer to its natural rate. In the long run, however, the only eﬀect of inﬂation is
relative price variability, so optimal policy always returns to zero inﬂation.
As in our main model, the nature of optimal policy is more complicated when there are
persistent markup shocks. Just as in our model, optimal policy involves a gradual adjustment
of the price level in response to a shock. Yet now the price level is non-stationary: it remains
forever higher after a shock that raises prices.
T h er e s u l tt h a ti n ﬂation rather than price-level targeting is optimal under Calvo pricing
may appear surprising in light of the previous literature. A number of authors study models
that include the Calvo Phillips curve and conclude that a price level target is optimal. The
discrepancy between our results and previous ones are explained by diﬀerences in the policy
problem being solved. There are two main diﬀerences.
First, some previous authors, such as King and Wolman (1999), study models in which
it is feasible to stabilize the price level perfectly. That is, there is a perfect relation between
a policy instrument and the current price level; there is no such thing as a demand shock
that policy cannot oﬀset contemporaneously, as with our assumption of monetary control
errors. In the King-Wolman model, the policy of keeping the price level absolutely constant
is optimal given the types of shocks they assume. A perfectly constant price level can be
interpreted as implementing either a constant price-level target or a zero inﬂation target.
That is, there is no meaningful distinction between price and inﬂation targeting if there are
22no shocks that raise the possibility of base drift.5
Vestin (1999) compares price and inﬂation targeting in versions of the Calvo model in
which these policies are diﬀerent, and concludes that price targeting is optimal. The problem
he solves, however, is that of the optimal policy rule under “discretion.” That is, he asks
whether it is optimal to appoint a policymaker whose objective function is the variance
of prices or the variance of inﬂation, given that the policymaker cannot precommit to his
preferred policy because it is not dynamically consistent. In contrast, we study optimal
policy under commitment: we assume that policymakers can implement any rule they want
and ask which rule maximizes social welfare.6
8.3 Implications for Trend Inﬂation
A ﬁnal diﬀerence between our results and those for the Calvo model concern the welfare
consequences of trend inﬂation. As shown above, trend inﬂation is neutral in our model,
and so optimal policy can take the form of an increasing price level target rather than a
constant target. In contrast, the optimal inﬂation target in the Calvo version of the model
must be zero. That is, moving from Calvo to Mankiw-Reis price setting means introducing
the possibility of trend inﬂation as well as eliminating base drift in the price level. Here, the
diﬀerence in loss functions in the two models is crucial. In the Calvo model, welfare depends
on the variance of inﬂation around zero rather than around some mean level, so that zero
inﬂation is optimal. This reﬂects the fact that even steady inﬂation causes ineﬃcient relative-
price variability under Calvo’s assumption of sticky prices.
9C O N C L U S I O N
According to the model developed here, optimal monetary policy can be described as ﬂexible
targeting of the price level. The central bank should announce a target path of the price
5By contrast, Goodfriend and King (1997) brieﬂy consider the issue of imperfect control in a model with
staggered price setting. Their analysis conﬁrms our conclusion that base drift in the price level is optimal
in this type of model.
6Like Vestin, Svensson’s (1999) well-known paper on inﬂation versus price level targeting emphasizes the
case of discretion rather than commitment, but with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation for the Phillips curve.
23level and then commit itself to returning to this path in response to shocks. In response to
shocks to demand or productivity, it should return the price level as quickly as possible to
its target. In response to shocks to markups, which here reﬂect a type of supply shock, the
central bank should return the price level to its target more gradually over time. Described
diﬀerently, optimal policy allows the price level to deviate from its target only if output is
expected to deviate from its natural rate.
The optimality of targeting the price level rather than the inﬂation rate is a common
theme in the recent literature on monetary policy. For example, Hall (1984) and Hall and
Mankiw (1994) argue that a price level target would aid personal ﬁnancial planning by
making the cost of living far in the future more predictable. Svensson (1999) and Vestin
(1999) argue for price level targeting on the grounds that it would help solve some of the time-
inconsistency problems associated with discretionary monetary policy. Cover and Pecorino
(2001) claim that a price target is stabilizing because any inﬂationary shock automatically
causes a decrease in expected inﬂation and thus an increase in the real interest rate. The
analysis in this paper is very diﬀerent. Our households have no money illusion in ﬁnancial
planning, our monetary policymaker can commit to a policy rule, and we omit the eﬀect
of expected inﬂation on aggregate demand. Nonetheless, the bottom line for policy is the
same: central banks should target the price level, not the inﬂation rate.
These results leave open an intriguing question: Why have central banks adopted inﬂation
targeting if price level targeting has all these desirable properties? One possible answer is
that central bankers know something about the world that is missing in these theories of
optimal policy. But another possibility is that central bankers have been misled by assuming,
incorrectly, that some features of the recent monetary regime are structural, while in fact
these features would change if policy did.
Price dynamics are the natural place to look for such a mistaken assumption. The recent
data are well described by a backward-looking Phillips curve. If this equation for price
dynamics were invariant to policy, then inﬂation targeting would be optimal, and price level
targeting would be unattractive. (Ball, 1999). But a radical change in the monetary policy
rule, such as a target for the price level, would most likely alter the reduced-form equation for
the Phillips curve. Whether the particular behavioral model we have examined in this paper
24correctly captures the shift that would occur is open to debate. But the results presented
here suggest the issue is well worth pursuing, for the implications for monetary policy could
not be more profound.
25Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the many results alluded to in the main text.
The model
Our notation and approach builds on Woodford (2002). Each agent’s problem is to
maximize the expected value of the sum of discounted utility:
E0
Ã
(1 − β)
∞ X
t=0
β
tUt
!
(A1)
where the utility function Ut is deﬁned in (1) and β is the discount factor. (Later we will
focus on the case when β goes to 1). This must be subject to the budget constraint:
Z 1
0
C
j
itPjtdj + Mit + Et [Qt+1Vit+1]=( 1− τt)PitYit + Tt + Mit−1 + Vit.
Agents spend their wealth purchasing the diﬀerent varieties C
j
i for consumption, and ac-
quiring money balances Mt. They receive income from selling their product of specialization
Yi for the price Pi, paying a share τ of sales revenue to the government. Tax revenues are
instantly returned to consumers by lump-sum transfers T, which also include monetary in-
jections into the economy. Mt−1 units of money are brought forward from the last period.
The assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets means agents can insure themselves against
idiosyncratic uncertainty. We let Vt stand for the total nominal value of the portfolio of
ﬁnancial assets brought into period t. In order to acquire a bond portfolio at t which re-
turns Vt+1 in the next period, the agent must expend an amount given by the conditional
expectation Et [Qt+1Vit+1],w h e r eQt+1 is the stochastic discount factor between t and t+1.
The agent faces two further constraints: the production function in (3); and a cash in
advance constraint: PtCit ≤ Mit.
Optimization with respect to C
j
i leads to the demand function in (4), where the aggregate
price index is deﬁned as:
Pt =
·Z 1
0
P
1−γ
it di
¸ 1
1−γ
. (A2)
26Since agents are all ex ante identical and there are complete ﬁnancial markets, they will
all have the same ex post wealth. Thus, they will make the same consumption decisions and
the common level of consumption is denoted by Ct. An Euler equation links the stochastic
discount factor to consumption. We assume that Et(Qt+1) is always strictly smaller than
one, which can be ensured by for example having a suﬃciently high deterministic growth in
output. This ensures that money has a lower return than a riskless bond, which in turn leads
to the cash in advance constraint holding as an equality as another optimality condition.
Finally, agents decide what price they desire to charge P∗
it given the demand function in
(4). The ﬁrst-order condition is:
P∗
it
Pt
=
γ
(γ − 1)(1 − τt)
Cσ
t L
ψ
it
At
. (A3)
The ﬁrst fraction on the right hand side is the markup, given by the standard monopoly
markup γ/(γ−1) divided by the tax wedge (1−τ). The second fraction is the real marginal
cost of production, given by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labor (the shadow cost of labor supply) CσL
ψ
i , divided by the marginal product of labor A.
Having established all the optimality conditions, we determine the equilibrium by impos-
ing the market clearing conditions: C = Y , Ci = Yi. Substituting out for Lit in (A3) using
the production function (3), and then using the demand function (4) to substitute out for
Yi, we obtain (after taking logs):
p
∗
it = pt + αyt −
(1 + ψ)log(At)
1+γψ
−
log(1 − τt)
1+γψ
+
log(γ/(1 − γ))
1+γψ
(A4)
where α =( ψ + σ)/(1 + γψ).
The natural level of output is deﬁned in the text by the conditions: (i) pi = p∗
i for all i
(prices are ﬂexible) and (ii) τ =¯ τ (no markup shocks). Since the right hand side of (A4) is
the same for all i, pi = p. These conditions and (A4) lead to the natural level of output in
(6). Using this result to substitute A out from (A4) gives equation (5).
We work with a linearized version of the price index in (A2). A ﬁr s t - o r d e rT a y l o ra p -
proximation around the point where all products’ prices are the same, gives the approximate
27price index, as the simple arithmetic average: pt =
R 1
0 pitdi. Given the arrival rate of λ of
new information for each ﬁrm, there is a share λ(1 − λ)k of ﬁrms that last adjusted their
price plan k periods ago. The price index therefore becomes:
pt = λ
∞ X
k=0
(1 − λ)
kEt−k (p
∗
it)
Using the expression for p∗
it in (5), leads to equation (8) in the text.
Equation (8) can be re-written as:
pt = λ(pt + α(yt − y
N
t )+ut)+λ
∞ X
j=0
(1 − λ)
j+1Et−1−j
£
pt + α(yt − y
N
t )+ut
¤
. (A5)
Subtracting the analogue of equation (8) for pt−1 from this expression above, we obtain an
expression for the inﬂation rate:
πt = λ(pt + α(yt − y
N
t )+ut)+λ
∞ X
j=0
(1 − λ)
jEt−1−j
£
∆pt + α(∆yt − ∆y
N
t )+∆ut
¤
−λ
2
∞ X
j=0
(1 − λ)
jEt−1−j
£
pt + α(yt − y
N
t )+ut
¤
.
Now, equation (A5) can be rearranged to show that:
λpt −
λ
2
1 − λ
(α(yt − y
N
t )+ut)=λ
2
∞ X
j=0
(1 − λ)
jEt−1−j
£
pt + α(yt − y
N
t )+ut
¤
Using this to replace for the last term in the previous expression, and rearranging gives the
Phillips curve in equation (9).
Since from optimality the cash in advance constraint holds as an equality, taking logs
and using the market clearing condition to replace c by y, we obtain equation (10).
Replacing for y in the equation for the price level (8) using the demand side equation
28(10), we obtain an equation for the price level:
(1 − λ(1 − α))pt = αλ(2 − λ)ˆ mt + λ(αet − αy
N
t + ut)
+λ(1 − λ)
£
(1 − α)Et−1pt + Et−1ut − αEt−1y
N
t
¤
+λ
∞ X
j=2
(1 − λ)
jEt−j
£
(1 − α)pt + α(ˆ mt − y
N
t )+ut
¤
.
Taking expectations of this expression at time t − 1 gives:
(1 − λ(2 − λ)(1 − α))Et−1pt = αλ(2 − λ)ˆ mt + λ(2 − λ)(Et−1ut − αEt−1y
N
t )
+λ
∞ X
j=2
(1 − λ)
jEt−j
£
(1 − α)pt + α(ˆ mt − y
N
t )+ut
¤
.
The policymaker controls the ﬁr s tt e r mi nt h er i g h th a n ds i d e ,a n do b s e r v e sa l lt h eo t h e r
terms in the right hand side. Therefore, it can set Et−1pt at whatever level it desires.
Conversely, for any given value of Et−1pt, the equation above determines the corresponding
ˆ mt.
The welfare approximation
We approximate the utility function around the equilibrium point when there are no
real disturbances, so we set all shocks at their means. As Woodford (2002) emphasizes, it
is important for the accuracy of the approximation that this equilibrium is close to being
eﬃcient. One assumption that ensures it is E(
γ
γ−1(1−τ)) = 1, so the expected markup is 1.
The point of linearization is then:
¯ yt =
(1 + ψ)¯ at
ψ + σ
,
where ¯ al =l o g (¯ At).
We approximate:
Ut =
e(1−σ)yt
1 − σ
−
Z 1
0
e(1+ψ)(yit−at)
1+ψ
di,
29where the production function was used to replace for Lit and market clearing to replace
consumption by output. A second order Taylor approximation gives:
Ul≈ e
(1−σ)¯ yt
µ
ˆ yt +
1 − σ
2
ˆ y
2
t
¶
− e
(1+ψ)(¯ yt−¯ at)
Z 1
0
µ
ˆ yit +
1+ψ
2
ˆ y
2
it − (1 + ψ)ˆ yitˆ at
¶
di + t.i.p,
where ˆ yt = yt − ¯ yt, ˆ at = at − ¯ at, ˆ yit = yit − ¯ yt and additive terms that are independent of
policy are collected in t.i.p. Deﬁning the cross-sectional mean as Ei(ˆ yit)=
R
ˆ yitdi and the
cross-sectional variance as Va r i(ˆ yit)=Ei(ˆ y2
it) − Ei(ˆ yit)2, we can re-write this expression as:
e
(1−σ)¯ yt
µ
ˆ yt +
1 − σ
2
ˆ y
2
t
¶
− e
(1+ψ)(¯ yt−¯ at)
µ
Ei(ˆ yit)+
1+ψ
2
¡
Va r i(ˆ yit)+Ei(ˆ yit)
2¢
− (1 + ψ)ˆ atEi(ˆ yit)
¶
+ t.i.p.
A second order approximation of the CES aggregator in equation (2), around ¯ yt yields:
ˆ yt ≈ Ei(ˆ yit) −
1 − γ−1
2
Va r i(ˆ yit).
Using this expression to substitute for Ei(ˆ yit) in the previous expression, and dropping third
or higher stochastic order terms, we obtain:
Ut ≈ e
(1−σ)¯ yt
µ
ˆ yt +
1 − σ
2
ˆ y
2
t
¶
− e
(1+ψ)(¯ yt−¯ at)
µ
ˆ yt +
1+ψ
2
ˆ y
2
t +
γ−1 + ψ
2
Va r i(ˆ yit) − (1 + ψ)ˆ atˆ yt
¶
+ t.i.p.
Now, realize that from the deﬁnition of ¯ yt: (1 − σ)¯ yt =( 1+ψ)(¯ yt−¯ at). Combining the two
terms in brackets we obtain:
Ut ≈− e
(1−σ)¯ ytσ + ψ
2
µ
ˆ y
2
t − 2
(1 + ψ)
σ + ψ
ˆ atˆ yt +
γ−1 + ψ
σ + ψ
Va r i(ˆ yit)
¶
+ t.i.p.
Next, recall the deﬁnition of the natural rate in (6) to replace for the second term inside
the brackets, and add a term in
¡
ˆ yN
t
¢2 to the expression which is valid since this is a t.i.p.
30Dropping the proportionality factor, which is beyond the control of the policymaker, gives:
−Ut ≈ (ˆ yt − ˆ y
N
t )
2 +
γ−1 + ψ
σ + ψ
Va r i(ˆ yit − ˆ yt)+t.i.p.
We include ˆ yt inside the cross-sectional variance since this term does not vary with i.N e x t ,
note that we can drop all the hats from the output variables as they all share the same point
of approximation ¯ yt. Finally, note that given our assumption that the expected markup is
one, to a ﬁrst-order approximation E(yt) ≈ E(yN
t ), so we can re-write the expression as:
−Ul≈ (yt − y
N
t − E(yt − y
N
t ))
2 +
γ−1 + ψ
σ + ψ
Va r i(yit − yt)+t.i.p.
Using this expression, we can take the unconditional expectation of (A1) to obtain equation
(12) in the text. If the discount factor β approaches one, the expectation of the sum of
discounted utility over time equals this expression.
P r o o fo ft h el e m m a
We start the proof by introducing some useful notation. We use Λk to denote the fraction
of price setters that has updated their information by k periods after an event:
Λ
k = λ
k X
j=0
(1 − λ)
j. (A6)
We denote the deviation of the price level from its expected value j periods ago by: ptpj =
pt − Et−j(pt). Finally, we will denote the deviation of the optimal price set by group j of
price-setters relative to the overall price index in the economy by: p∗
tpj = Et−j(p∗
t) − pt.
We now prove the main lemma through a sequence of other lemmas.
Lemma A.1:
p
∗
tpi−1 =
ptpi − ptpi−1
Λi−1 + p
∗
tpi
31Proof. From the deﬁnition of ptpi:
ptpi = pt − Et−i(pt)
= ptpi−1 + Et−i+1(pt) − Et−i(pt). (A7)
From the supply equation in (8) and using the law of iterated expectations:
Et−i(pt)=Λ
i−1Et−i(p
∗
t)+λ
∞ X
j=i
(1 − λ)
jEt−j (p
∗
t). (A8)
Using this and its equivalent for i-1, we obtain:
Et−i(pt) − Et−i+1(pt)=Λ
i−1(Et−i(p
∗
t) − Et−i+1(p
∗
t))
= Λ
i−1(p
∗
tpi − p
∗
tpi−1).
Replacing this result in (A8) gives the desired result.
Lemma A.2:
Va r i(pit)=
T X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶
p
2
tpi +
p2
tpT+1
ΛT +2 p
∗
tpT+1ptpT+1 + Λ
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 + λ
∞ X
j=T+2
(1 − λ)
jp
∗2
tpj,
for all T ≥ 1.
Proof. From the deﬁnition of the cross-sectional variance:
Va r i(pit)=λ
T+1 X
j=0
(1 − λ)
jp
∗2
tpj + λ
∞ X
j=T+2
(1 − λ)
jp
∗2
tpj,
s oa l lw eh a v et os h o wi st h a t :
T X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶
p
2
tpi +
p2
tpT+1
ΛT +2 p
∗
tpT+1ptpT+1 + Λ
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 = λ
T+1 X
j=0
(1 − λ)
jp
∗2
tpj. (A9)
We prove that this is true for any T≥1 by induction.
32F o rT = 1 ,n o t et h a tt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( A 9 )e q u a l s :
λp
∗2
tp0 + λ(1 − λ)p
∗2
tp1 + λ(1 − λ)
2p
∗2
tp2
= λ
³ptp1
Λ0 + p
∗
tp1
´2
+ λ(1 − λ)p
∗2
tp1 + λ(1 − λ)
2p
∗2
tp2
where the second line comes from using Lemma A.1 to replace for p∗
tp0. Calculating the square, and
collecting terms this equals:
p2
tp1
Λ0 +2 p
∗
tp1ptp1 + Λ
1p
∗2
tp1 + λ(1 − λ)
2p
∗2
tp2
Next, use Lemma A.1 again to now replace for p∗
tp1, which leads to, after taking squares and
cancelling some terms:
p2
tp1
Λ0 +2
µ
ptp2 − ptp1
Λ1
¶
ptp1 +
(ptp2 − ptp1)
2
Λ1 +2 p
∗
tp2ptp2 + Λ
2p
∗2
tp2
Combining the second and third term gives:
µ
1
Λ0 −
1
Λ1
¶
p
2
tp1 +
p2
tp2
Λ1 +2 p
∗
tp2ptp2 + Λ
2p
∗2
tp2
which shows (A9) holds when T=1.
Continuing the proof by induction, we now show that if (A9) holds for T-1, then it will also
hold for T. From the deﬁnition of the cross-sectional variance and since (A9) holds for T-1, we
know that:
λ
T X
j=0
(1 − λ)
jp
∗2
tpj =
T−1 X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶
p
2
tpi +
p2
tpT
ΛT−1 +2 p
∗
tpTptpT + Λ
Tp
∗2
tpT,
which implies that:
T X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶
p
2
tpi +
p2
tpT+1
ΛT +2 p
∗
tpT+1ptpT+1 + Λ
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 + λ
∞ X
j=T+2
(1 − λ)
jp
∗2
tpj − Va r i(pit)=
33−λ(1 − λ)
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 +
p2
tpT+1 − p2
tpT
ΛT +2 p
∗
tpT+1ptpT+1 − 2p
∗
tpTptpT + Λ
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 − Λ
Tp
∗2
tpT.
(A.10)
Now, from lemma A.1:
p2
tpT+1 − p2
tpT
ΛT =
¡
p
∗
tpT − p
∗
tpT+1
¢
(ptpT+1 + ptpT),
so the right hand side of (A.10) becomes:
−λ(1 − λ)
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 +
¡
p
∗
tpT − p
∗
tpT+1
¢
(ptpT+1 + ptpT)+2 p
∗
tpT+1ptpT+1 − 2p
∗
tpTptpT + Λ
T+1p
∗2
tpT+1 − Λ
Tp
∗2
tpT.
Cancelling terms and rearranging, this equals:
(ptpT+1 − ptpT)(p
∗
tpT + p
∗
tpT+1) − Λ
T(p
∗2
tpT − p
∗2
tpT+1).
But using Lemma A.1 for i=T+1, this equals zero. Looking back at (A.10), this shows that (A9)
holds for T, which completes the proof by induction, and also the proof of the lemma.
Lemma A.3:
Va r i(pit)=
∞ X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶
p
2
tpi
Proof. Since lemma A.2 holds for all T, we can take limits as T→∞ ,t oo b t a i n :
Va r i(pit)=
∞ X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶
p
2
tpi +
p2
tp∞
Λ∞ +2 p
∗
tp∞ptp∞ + Λ
∞p
∗2
tp∞.
Next, realize that Λ∞ = λ
P∞
j=0(1 − λ)i =1 . Also, from (A8) at i= ∞,E t−∞(pt)=Et−∞(p∗
t),
so it follows that p∗
tp∞ = −ptp∞. Using these results in the expression above, proves the lemma.
Finally, starting from lemma A.3 and using the deﬁnition of ptpi and the fact that from
the properties of geometric series Λi =1− (1 − λ)i+1 proves the main lemma.
Time 0 impact of shocks
34Since policy is pre-determined at the time of a shock, its contemporaneous impact is
the same regardless of policy. This is determined by the system of two equations in the
deviations of p and y from their pre-shock levels (denoted by a ~over the variable):
˜ pt = λ
¡
˜ pt + α(˜ yt − ˜ y
N
t )+˜ ut
¢
˜ pt +˜ yt =˜ et.
Solving this gives the time 0 impact of a unit shock to demand or to the (negative of the)
natural rate: ˜ pt = αλ/(1 − λ(1 − α)) and ˜ yt − ˜ yN
t =( 1− λ)/(1 − λ(1 − α)),a n dt h ei m p a c t
of a unit shock to markups: ˜ pt = −˜ yt = λ/(1 − λ(1 − α)).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Under the proposed policy, since Kt is deterministic, Et−jpt = Kt for all j ≥ 1. Taking
expectations at t − 1 of the equation for the price level (8) we obtain:
0=Et−1(yt − y
N
t )+
∞ X
j=1
(1 − λ)
jEt−j
¡
yt − y
N
t
¢
This diﬀerence equation has the solution Et−1(yt −yN
t )=0 ,s oa n ys h o c k sa tt−1 or before
have no eﬀect on the ﬁrst term in the welfare function. Policy is therefore minimizing the
variance of (yt − yN
t ), which varies only with shocks at time t, which policy can do nothing
about.
From lemma 1 and given the proposed policy:
Va r i(pit − pt)=
∞ X
j=1
ηj (pt − Kt)
2
=( pt − Et−1pt)
2
Ã
∞ X
j=1
ηj
!
.
It then follows that the cross-sectional dispersion of prices is minimized, since unanticipated
changes in the price level occur only with respect to innovations at time t, and policy, which
is set at t − 1, can do nothing about these. Thus with respect to the second term in the
35welfare function, policy is also reaching the optimum. Thus, Kt minimizes the full welfare
function and so it is the optimal policy.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s2a n d3
The proof of propositions 2 and 3 with respect to demand and natural rate shocks follows
immediately from proposition 1. With markup shocks, we represent policy in reaction to
a shock as the set of coeﬃcients φj in the general representation: Et−1(pt)=
P∞
j=1 φjεt−j.
Similarly, we represent output by the set of ϕj in yt =
P∞
j=1 ϕjεt−j. From the supply curve
in (8), then:
∞ X
j=1
φjεt−j =
∞ X
j=1
Λ
j ¡
φjεt−j + αϕjεt−j + ρjεt−j
¢
Since this expression must hold for all possible realizations of εt−j, it then follows that:
ϕj =
1
α
µ
1 − Λj
Λj φj − ρj
¶
. (A11)
Noting that pt−Et−i(pt)=
Pi−1
j=0 φjεt−j and using lemma A.3, we can then write the objective
function as:
"
∞ X
j=1
ϕ
2
j + ω
∞ X
i=1
µ
1
Λi−1 −
1
Λi
¶ i−1 X
j=0
φ
2
j
#
σ
2, (A12)
where σ2 i st h ev a r i a n c eo fεt. Minimizing (A12) subject to (A11), gives the optimal policy
φj =
1
α2ω +
(1−λ)j+1
1−(1−λ)j+1
ρj.
(A key step is to realize that
P∞
i=j+1 (1/Λi−1 − 1/Λi)=1 /Λj−1.) This proves proposition 2.
As for proposition 3, we can use the solution above to solve for the output coeﬃcients using
(A11). We ﬁnd that the relation between output and the price level coeﬃcients is given by
ϕj = −αωφj, which proves proposition 3 when there are markup shocks.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
36Here we solve for the optimal policy with Calvo pricing, when there are only demand
shocks. The problem with natural rate shocks is precisely the same, so we set the yN
t to zero
for the proof. The problem facing the policymaker is to minimize:
E
(
(1 − β)
∞ X
t=0
β
t £
y
2
t + ωπ
2
t
¤
)
,
where for now we allow for discounting (β ≤ 1), but will then take the limit as β approaches
1. The minimization is subject to the constraints given by the quantity theory (10) and the
Phillips Curve:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(yt − y
N
t )+ut (A.13)
which corresponds to equation (17). As in our analysis with the sticky information Phillips
curve, we can see policy as perfectly choosing Et−1pt, or equivalently Et−1πt,b yu s i n gt h e
quantity theory equation.
Following the approach in Aoki (2002), we can ﬁnd the optimal policy under commitment
by minimizing the Lagrangian function:
E
(
(1 − β)
∞ X
t=0
β
t £
(y
2
t + ωπ
2
t)+2 ψt(πt − βπt+1 − κyt)
¤
)
,
where the ψt are Lagrange multipliers. The necessary conditions describing the optimum
(taking into account that πt is set conditional on t − 1 information) are:
yt = κψt
ωπtpt−1 = ψt−1 − ψtpt−1,
for all t ≥ 0, with the initial condition ψ−1 =0 , and introducing the notation: πtpt−1 =
Et−1πt. Combining the two ﬁrst-order conditions we obtain:
κωπt+1pt = yt − yt+1pt. (A.14)
37This gives us an expression for expected inﬂation, which we can use in the Phillips curve in
(A.13) to get:
κωπt = β(yt − yt+1pt)+κ
2ωyt.
T a k i n ge x p e c t a t i o n so ft h i sa tt−1, using (A.14) lagged one period, and rearranging yields:
βyt+1pt−1 − (1 + β + κ
2ω)ytpt−1 + yt−1 =0 .
This stochastic diﬀerence equation can be shown to have one root:
δ =
1+β + κ2ω −
q
(1 + β + κ2ω)
2 − 4β
2β
,
which is positive and smaller than one, and another root given by 1/δβ which is larger than
one. An explosive representation for output cannot be optimal, since then the variance of
output would be inﬁnity. Thus we can exclude the root which is larger than one. The
solution to the diﬀerence equation then is:
yt+jpt−1 = δ
j+1yt−1, (A.15)
for any j ≥ 0.
Combining this result with (A.14) gives the equation:
κωπt+1pt =( 1− δ)yt. (A.16)
We can use this in the Phillips curve (A.13) to obtain:
πt =
β(1 − δ)+κ2ω
κω
yt. (A.17)
38Using the quantity theory equation (10) we can derive:
yt − ytpt−1 = et − πt + πtpt−1.
Combining the results in (A.15) and (A.16) with this last expression gives:
yt − δyt−1 = et − πt +
1 − δ
κω
yt−1.
Finally, we can replace for all the terms in output using (A.17) and rearrange to get the ﬁnal
solution:
πt = δπt−1 +
β(1 − δ)+κ2ω
β(1 − δ)+κω(1 + κ)
et.
Taking expectations of this expression conditional on t−1 information and taking the limit
as β approaches 1, proves Proposition 4.
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43Figure 1. Impact of a demand shock with pricelevel or inflation targeting
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